

φάω, φάύω) and implying “eine freundliche Göttin niederen Rangs . . . , eine gute Fee.” I think this conjecture too must be discarded as unlikely. For the assumed existence of a “good fairy Phausō” is as gratuitous as that of a Favonina (and besides, *ao* for *av* does not seem to be paralleled in a literary papyrus).

I think the solution is simpler than inventing nonexistent words. The fifth letter in line 8 need not be an omicron, but may well be a sigma, written with its right curve continued almost to a complete circle, because it was linked to *another* sigma. Two sigmas sometimes tend to be linked, either in the way in

which, for example, ἔσσεται is written in *P. Heidelb.* 4011. 6 (= *Iliad* 11. 824),⁴ or simply as a lying figure 8.

Thus read in lines 6–8: τ[ῆν] δὲ πρεσβυτέραν ὡς μ[ί]αν⁵ φασ[σ]ῶν εἶναι: “. . . to an ugly woman (say) that she is ‘fascinating’ (or ‘sexy’), and to a middle-aged one, that she is a ‘wild pigeon.’” The sexual overtone implied in the compliment “pigeon” needs no comment. And the embellishment “a wild pigeon” (φάσσα) proves that a climax was intended by the sophisticated Philaenis.⁶

MIROSLAV MARCOVICH

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA

4. A facsimile of *P. Heidelb.* 4011 is to be found in R. Seider, *Paläographie der griechischen Papyri*, II (Stuttgart, 1970), Pap. 17 on Pl. 9.

5. μ[ί]αν: Lobel comments: “A dot off the line.” I think the best candidate for the dot is a μ: cf. the μ in μὲν (line 3) and in περί φύλημάτ[ων] (line 9).

6. φάσσα, “wood pigeon,” is a twin sister of περιστέρα,

“pigeon”; cf., e.g., Arist. *HA* 8. 3. 593a16: “The wood pigeon and the common pigeon are visible at all seasons.” What is more important, Artemidorus (*Onirocrit.* 2. 20, p. 137. 11 Pack) informs us that to see a wood pigeon in a dream means to see a harlot: φάσαι καὶ περιστερὰ γυναῖκας σημαίνουσι, φάσαι μὲν πάντως πορνικάς, περιστερὰ δὲ ἔσθ’ ὅτε οἰκοδεσποῖνας καὶ κοσμίαις.

ΤΑ ΚΑΘ’ ΕΚΑΣΤΑ ΓΝΩΡΙΖΕΙΝ (EN 6. 1141b14–21)

οὐδ’ ἐστὶν ἡ φρόνησις τῶν
καθόλου μόνον, ἀλλὰ δεῖ καὶ τὰ καθ’ ἕκαστα γνωρίζειν·
πρακτικὴ γάρ, ἡ δὲ πράξις περὶ τὰ καθ’ ἕκαστα. διὸ καὶ
ἐνιοὶ οὐκ εἰδότες ἐτέρων εἰδόντων πρακτικώτεροι, καὶ ἐν τοῖς
ἄλλοις οἱ ἐμπειροὶ· εἰ γὰρ εἰδείη ὅτι τὰ κοῦφα εὐπεπτα
κρέα καὶ ὑγιεινά, ποῖα δὲ κοῦφα ἀγνοοῖ, οὐ ποιήσει ὑγι-
ειαν, ἀλλ’ ὁ εἰδὼς ὅτι τὰ ὀρνίθια κοῦφα καὶ ὑγιεινά ποιή-
σει μᾶλλον [Bekker].

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Someone reading this passage might be tempted to think, as for instance Hardie seems to, that the items designated by the occurrences of τὰ καθ’ ἕκαστα in lines 15 and 16 are individual birds and that these birds are perceptible. Hardie writes of the example Aristotle gives here: “The thought of the fully informed moral agent could be expressed in two syllogisms: the first specifying chicken as light food and the second applying the prescription of chicken to the food in the larder with the aid of a perceptual premiss, this is chicken.”¹ But are these καθ’ ἕκαστα individual perceptible birds for Aristotle? Is each of them an individual bird, say, this or that chicken?

On the basis of our present text, the answer almost surely must be negative. Aristotle says that if someone were to know that light meats were digestible and healthful, but he did not know what kinds (ποιῶ) were light, he would not produce health, but whoever knew that bird meats were light and healthful rather would produce it. The question is not which perceptible individuals have light meat: if Aristotle had wanted to ask that, he would have written τίνων δὲ κοῦφα ἀγνοοῖ, not ποῖα δὲ κοῦφα ἀγνοοῖ. The question is rather what kinds are light. The answer to τίνων would have been that these birds have light meat (ὅτι τούτων τῶν ὀρνίθων κοῦφα); but in place

1. W. F. R. Hardie, *Aristotle's Ethical Theory* (Oxford, 1968), p. 243.

of this the text has it that bird meats are light (*ὅτι τὰ ὀρνίθια κοῦφα*). Thus it would be truer to say that τὰ καθ' ἑκάστα in this passage are kinds of animals' meats—bird meats—than that they are individual birds, even though Aristotle and everyone else presumably would agree that, when one is on a diet, knowing which kinds of meat are light (*ποῖα*) won't do much good if it isn't known which individual animals (*τίνων*) have these kinds of meat.

Some scholars will have a philosophical difficulty with this. It is customary to render καθ' ἑκάστα by "particulars," and those who identify particulars with individuals will not see the sense of distinguishing, among particulars, individuals from kinds. Nor will they see the sense of distinguishing perceptible particulars from nonperceptible particulars. Hence Burnet's gloss on *περὶ τὰ καθ' ἑκάστα* in line 16:

The sphere (*περί*) or matter (*ἐν*) of *πράξις* is always the particular; for we cannot perform any act that is not a particular act. Hence our

deliberative analysis cannot be complete till we have carried it as far as the particular. In science this is impossible; for particulars are the objects of *αἴσθησις* alone.²

As Professor D. M. Balme has pointed out, however, "τὸ καθ' ἑκάστον, literally 'the each by each,' is Aristotle's expression for (a) the *infima species*, (b) the individual member of a species, also called the 'numerically one.' In zoology he is usually referring to the species . . ."³ And of course the reference before us in the *Ethica* is zoological.

In an effort to identify τὰ καθ' ἑκάστα as individuals, an editor might try to patch up the text by omitting epsilon and writing *ὀρνίθια* for *ὀρνίθια* (the birdies are light and healthful), following K^b. This would not do away with the difficulty posed by *ποῖα*; and when one distinguishes two senses of τὸ καθ' ἑκάστον as Balme does, the need for such an emendation disappears.⁴

J. J. MULHERN

BRYN MAWR COLLEGE

2. J. Burnet, *The Ethics of Aristotle* (London, 1900), p. 269.

3. D. M. Balme (trans.), *Aristotle: De partibus animalium I and De generatione animalium I* (Oxford, 1972), p. 106.

4. I wish to acknowledge the kind assistance of my colleagues R. Hamilton of the Departments of Greek and Latin and M. L. Lang of the Department of Greek, as well as of my student M. J. Logan of the Department of Philosophy.

ARISTOPHANES WASPS 74-77: THE MISSING VICE

Σω. Ἀμυνίας μὲν ὁ Προνάπους φήσ' οὕτοσι
εἶναι φιλόκυβον αὐτόν.

Ξα. ἄλλ' οὐδὲν λέγει, 75
μὰ Δί', ἀλλ' ἀφ' αὐτοῦ τὴν νόσον τεκμαίρεται.

Σω.
Ξα. οὐκ, ἀλλὰ "φιλο-" μὲν ἐστὶν ἀρχὴ τοῦ κακοῦ.

Several arrangements of speakers have been suggested in order to make sense of this passage, but Bergk, Meineke, Starkie, and now MacDowell (whose text I print) are surely right to posit a lacuna, wherein Sosias would pretend to report the suggestion of a member of the audience as to Philocleon's "disease." (On the problems involved, cf. MacDowell, *CQ*, N.S. XV [1965], 48 f.) Our next step should be to determine the missing guess, working back from the punch line. MacDowell's tentative suggestions, *φιλό-*

παις (called *νόσος* by Callim. *Epigr.* 46. 6) and *φιλογύνης*, and *φιλόδικος* (which MacDowell favors), inserted wrongly in line 77 by R, seem weak from this point of view. As a more plausible conjecture, I should like to suggest *φιλαρχος*, "desirous of holding office." It is certainly no objection that the word is not attested before Plato (*Rep.* 549A, *Phd.* 82C), for Aristophanes would have coined the word if necessary, as he has done with *φιλόκυβος* and *φιλοθύτης* in this very passage. The joke would now lie